Remembering How to Fight: Lessons from Task Force 2-7’s Damn Fine Soldiers and the Future of LSCO
In the spring of 2003, my unit, Task Force 2-7 Infantry, led one of the most audacious and successful mechanized attacks in modern U.S. military history. Over 21 days, we fought eight decisive engagements, traversed 350 miles, and helped pave the way for the fall of Baghdad. It was the last true Large Scale Combat Operation (LSCO) the U.S. Army has conducted. Almost 23 years later, it is time we remembered how to do it again. Young Soldiers, combat leaders, policy makers, and defense industry professionals take heed.
2003: The Last LSCO
Operation Iraqi Freedom began with a blitzkrieg-style thrust into Iraq. Our battalion task force, part of the 3rd Infantry Division, was the tip of the spear. We breached the border, fought through cities like As Samawah and Karbala, seized Saddam International Airport, and secured Baghdad’s key terrain to force Saddam’s downfall. We faced tanks, mortars, RPGs, suicide bombers, and more. We fought in the open desert, in urban terrain, and through sandstorms that turned the world into Mars.
We didn’t have perfect intelligence. We didn’t have guaranteed logistics. What we had were good soldiers, good leaders, and a plan built on simplicity, speed, and violence of action. We adapted on the fly, made hard decisions under fire, and relied on small-unit leadership to carry the day.
What the Army Must Remember
The Army today is rediscovering LSCO after two decades of counterinsurgency. LSCO is bigger and it is fundamentally different. It demands:
Tempo over perfection: In 2003, we didn’t wait for perfect conditions. We moved fast, accepted risk, and kept the enemy off balance. LSCO requires initiative and momentum, not paralysis by analysis.
Distributed trust: Our success hinged on platoon leaders making life-or-death decisions in real time. LSCO demands decentralized execution and trust in junior leaders.
Logistics as a weapon: We outran our supply lines. We cannibalized parts, rationed fuel, and improvised repairs. Future LSCO must treat logistics as a critical warfighting function, not an afterthought.
Adaptability under fire: We fought tanks where they weren’t supposed to be. Ambushes were everywhere. We discovered the hard way what IEDs were. And, we believed every move or countermove we made had the potential to trigger chemical or biological weapons. We changed formations, rerouted convoys, and adjusted tactics on the move. We remained in motion as much as we could and tried not to get too comfortable—when we did, Soldiers died. LSCO is chaos. Adaptability is survival.
Leadership presence: Leaders were in the dirt or in the turret, not in the TOC. Soldiers need to see their leaders in the fight. LSCO is personal, and presence matters.
Looking Ahead: LSCO in the 21st Century
The next LSCO won’t look like Iraq. It may be in the Pacific, Europe, or somewhere unexpected. It will involve multiple, contested domains. In 2003, the joint force could surge its combat power on land and operate with impunity everywhere else. In 2025 or beyond, the joint force will fight hard in the air, land, sea, cyberspace, space, and information domains. But the fundamentals remain:
Train for the fight you haven’t seen yet: Don’t prepare for the last war. Prepare for the next one. That means realistic training, not scripted exercises. Train to be adaptable.
Embrace technology, but don’t depend on it: Our Blue Force Tracker was a great asset, but it failed us more than once. Radio waves struggled in the cities. Tech is a tool, not a crutch. And it will fail you when you need it the most. Just make that assumption now. Our future adversary will jam us or use our own technology to deceive or target us. We must adapt our technologies at the edge, in near-real time. Technologies must be modular, upgradable, software-definable or re-definable, and perhaps even 3D printable. Monolithic, hard-coded solutions will last days not weeks. Certainly not months.
Build resilient formations: Units must be able to fight dispersed, degraded, and disconnected. Units must be adept at fighting on the move, with staffs coordinating on the move, and commanders commanding on the move. LSCO won’t allow comfort or predictability.
Relearn the art of maneuver: LSCO is about seizing terrain, destroying formations, and breaking the enemy’s will. It’s not about holding checkpoints or winning hearts and minds. That comes later.
Learn how to fix what is broken: LSCO will break things. When the dust settles, normalcy, governance, and critical services must resume quickly or else civilians will starve, fight each other, or organize an insurgency. The post-LSCO situation has potential to create sustainable chaos, requiring an entire generation of Soldiers to reverse.
Conclusion: The Legacy of 2-7 Infantry
Back in 2003, I didn’t realize that Task Force 2-7 Infantry would write the last chapter of LSCO in the U.S. Army’s playbook. It is time to open that book again. The lessons are in the mud, the blood, and the brotherhood (& sisterhood). We must remember how to fight large, fast, and hard because the world is dangerous and the next LSCO is coming. And when it does, we must be willing and able.